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THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DIRECT EFFECT IN
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: YOU CAN
LOOK... BUT CAN YOU TOUCH?
In all national intellectual property' regimes, there is a tension
between competing public interests. On the one hand, national governments want to encourage creativity and innovation in artistic and
industrial spheres and, accordingly, have created intellectual property
rights (IPRs) to reward the innovator. On the other hand, if such
rights are inviolable permanently, or even for excessively long periods
of time, a creator could create and hold onto a monopoly over the
creation and distribution (through, for example, licensing) of his innovation. This situation, while of great benefit to the creator, does
not inure to the benefit of the market and, indeed, society as a whole.
This is the normal tension within a country. In today's world of
rapid technological developments and increased global trade, these
tensions have assumed international proportions. Conflicts among
the nations' intellectual property regimes-each with its own guiding
principles, rules, and enforcement procedures-have distorted international trade and, in the course of these conflicts, individuals' private
rights in their intellectual property have been trampled.
The European Community (the Community or EC) has made the
creation of a Common Market its mission, not just for intellectual
property, but for all areas of economic activity. In its efforts to do so,
the EC has been vigilant to block and reverse Member States' measures that have the purpose or even the effect of hindering transborder
trade. In the area of IPRs, however, the EC has been confronted with
an especially complex area of law. There have been some efforts to
harmonize the Member States' regimes, notably in the creation of the
Community trademark and partial harmonization in the area of copyrights; however, intellectual property remains an area in which the EC
has made slow progress in its reinforcement of the Common Market.
1 Intellectual property is a generic term that encompasses both industrial and

artistic forms of property rights, of which some of the most common are patents,
trademarks, copyrights, industrial designs, topographies of integrated circuits, and
undisclosed information.
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In the late 1980s, the nations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) initiated the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations to craft what is undoubtedly the most ambitious
and comprehensive trade agreement in world history, resulting in the
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 The field of
intellectual property was, for the first time, brought under the purview
of the GATT, and a new international intellectual property agreement
was signed, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (commonly
called the TRIPs Agreement).3 Both the Community and all its Member States became original contracting Members of the WTO Agreement, which entails automatic adoption of, inter alia, the TRIPs
Agreement. 4 In this way, the issue of the Community's external competence was prevented from arising on the international plane. For
the Community, TRIPs has become a mixed agreement in which it
shares competence with the Member States, as declared in Opinion
1/94 of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 5
The central question of this Note is whether the TRIPs Agreement has "direct effect" in EC law. A provision of Community law is
said to have "direct effect" when it gives rise to individual rights or
obligations which an individual, an institution, or even a State may
assert before national (and, of course, Community) courts. To have
direct effect, a provision must be (1) clear and unambiguous and (2)
unconditional, in the sense that it does not require any substantial
exercise of discretion regarding implementation by Member States. 6
Thus, this Note seeks to ascertain whether TRIPs provisions, without
the need of further implementation, create private rights in Community law which may be invoked directly by individuals or organizations.

2 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
Vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (final version) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
4 WTO Agreement art. X1V(1).
5 Opinion 1/94, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, 1994
E.C.R. 1-5267, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205 (1994) [hereinafter Article 228(6) Opinion].
6 See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Ondernening van Gend
S&Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 11.
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Prior to the creation of the WTO, the EC's forays into the protection of IPRs were slow and sporadic. 7 IPRs were considered fields for
the Member States' competence except insofar as the EC had established a Community right (e.g., the Community trademark). The
main conventions on IPRs, the Berne Convention on copyrights and
the Paris Convention on know-how, were signed by some (but not all)
Member States, and the EC was not a signatory. The Member States'
constitutional attitudes toward the international treaties they had
signed were reflected in the extent to which these treaties had direct
effect in that nation's laws. Most of the European signatories, having
a monist constitutional approach to international conventions, gave
direct effect to the treaties, provided the criteria for direct effect were
met. Some, notably the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland, would only accept such conventions into the body of national
law once they had been formally enacted by their legislatures (the dualist approach). As a result of these different constitutional approaches to the incorporation of international agreements into
national law, protection of IPRs throughout Europe has not been
uniform.
A.

The ECJ's Approach to InternationalConventions in General

Article 228(7) of the EC Treaty provides that international agreements concluded by the Community are Community law and, as such,
are binding on Community institutions and Member States.8 Furthermore, the ECJ has decided that international treaties can have direct
effect in EC law. In Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione delle
Finanze, the court held that Article 2(1) of the Yaoundi Convention
was directly effective, 9 while-in Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg &?
Cie KG, the court came to the same conclusion regarding Article 21 of
the EC-Portugal Trade Agreement. 10 Provided that the relevant provision confers clear rights on individuals, the convention-or, for that
See generally W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
(1989); PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BfiRCA, EC LAW
1027-65 (1995); STEVEN WEAT-mERIL & PAUL BEAUMoNT, EC LAw 726-52 (1995). For
7

TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS

the best, up-to-date coverage of legislative developments in this field, see EUROPEAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEv.

8 See TREATY ESrABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMM-u1NrrY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C224)
1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY], art. 228(7).
9 Case 87/75, 1976 E.C.R. 129, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 62 (1976).
10 Case 104/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3641, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (1982).
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matter, legislation issued under the agreement-may have direct
effect."
In Office National de l'emploi (Onem) v. Bahia Kziber, the ECJ re-

viewed its case law on the question of whether an international treaty
concluded by the Community could have direct effect. The ECJ referred to its decision in Meryen Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund,

where it made the following conclusion:
A provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with
non-member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording and the purpose and
nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and
precise obligationwhich is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to
12
the adoption of any subsequent measure.

As applied in Kziber, this becomes a two-tiered test. First, the international agreement as a whole is examined to ascertain whether its
purpose and nature might exclude direct effect. This amounts to a
presumption in favor of direct effect to which an exception in the case
of a particular agreement might be made, "regard being had to its
purpose and nature." Then, when it has been established that direct
effect has not been "prevented" by the nature of the agreement, the
question of direct effect becomes provision-specific.
One item of interest in the ECJ's examination of the purpose of
an international agreement is the looseness of this test. In both the
Advocate General's and the court's opinions, the question of direct
effect is described as related to "governing the legal situation of individuals." Furthermore, Advocate General Van Gervern made the following statement:
When it looks to the nature and purpose of an international agreement, the Court considers whether that agreement does more than
merely impose reciprocal obligations on the signatory States; in
other words, whether the agreement is of such a nature as or is in13
tended to govern the legal situation of individuals.
The international agreement in Kziber was the Cooperation
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the
Kingdom of Morocco. The preamble of the agreement lists its purposes: to promote cooperation between the Community and Moll See Case 18/90, Office National de l'Emploi (Onem) v. Bahia Kziber, 1991
E.C.R. 1-199; Case 192/89, Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3461,
[1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 57 (1990).
12 Case 12/86, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 3720, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 421, 422 (1987) (emphasis added).
13 Kziber, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-211.

1999]

TRIPS AGREEMENT

AND

DIRECT EFFECT

rocco, to contribute to the economic and social development of
Morocco, and to strengthen relations between the parties. The Advocate General and the court held that these purposes did not preclude
the possible direct effect of any or all of its provisions. As far as the
nature of the agreement was concerned, the Advocate General noted
that it was to govern three areas: economic, technical, and financial
cooperation; trade cooperation; and labor cooperation. While it is
possible to construe the agreement as bearing directly on the "legal
situation of individuals," one is tempted to ask what point there is in
bothering to refer to the nature and purposes of the agreement when
purposes as state-oriented as those prefacing the international agreement in Kziber can be construed as pertaining to individual legal rights
and duties.
Like the TRIPs Agreement, the Cooperation Agreement in Kziber
was a mixed agreement. Though the matter was not specifically dealt
with by the ECJ, the question of the division of competencies of the
Member State and the Community in the conclusion of this agreement hovers over the case. The ECJ interpreted Articles 41 and 42 of
the Cooperation Agreement to decide if they had direct effect. Surprisingly, these articles concerned social security-a matter within the
exclusive competence of the Member States. This has prompted one
commentator to conclude:
The least which can be said ... is that a mixed agreement, being an
act of the Community institutions, creates an assumpti6n that a matter is within the power of the Community .... [T]hejurisprudence
in this case is maybe another step forward in the comprehension of
mixed agreements, namely, that in certain circumstances, they can
provide a basis for the Court of Justice to interpret provisions of
such agreements in relation to matters which remain in the exclu14
sive power of the Member State.
In summary, international conventions are capable of having direct effect in Community law. To ascertain whether provisions of an
international treaty have direct effect, the ECJ will employ a two-tiered
test. First, it will examine the purpose and nature of the agreement to
see if these exclude direct effect, keeping in mind that there is a presumption in favor of direct effect. Second, if the agreement is regarded as having the potential to be directly effective, the question of
direct effect becomes provision-specific. Kziberbetrays quite an expansive approach by the ECJ whereby it will proceed on the assumption
that all matters within a mixed agreement-even those within the ex14 Nanette Neuwahl, Social Security Under the EEC-Morocco CooperationAgreemwnt, 16
EuR. L. REv. 326, 333 (1991).
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clusive competence of the Member States-are within the power of
the Community and capable of being imbued by the court with direct
effect in Community law.
The Kziber approach becomes one option for the ECJ to approach the question of direct effect of any provision of TRIPs. In a
mixed agreement in which the Community and the Member States
share competence, however, it seems inappropriate to ask whether a
provision has direct effect in Community law if it is one which the
Community has no competence to conclude. This is, however, precisely what the court did in Kziber, and it is submitted that such an
approach is unsatisfactory.
B.

The ECJ's Approach to GATT in Particular

In InternationalFruit NV v. Produktshap voor Groenten en Fruit (3),
the ECJ held that GATT did not have direct effect for three reasons:
(1) GATT had no legal personality; (2) it was governed by mere reciprocity among members; and (3) the dispute settlement mechanism
was not judicial, but political. 15 It is notable also that the EC's only
involvement was to administer the agreement among the Member
States, in contrast to the new WTO, in which the Community is a contracting party.
A softening of the rigid approach taken in International Fruit
16
could be detected in two subsequent cases. In Fediol v. Commission,
the organization FEDIOL (the EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation) brought an action seeking the annulment of a Commission decision which rejected FEDIOL's request that the
Commission initiate a procedure to examine certain commercial practices of Argentina regarding the export of soya cake to the Community. FEDIOL had asked the Commission to act pursuant to
Regulation No. 2641/84, which referred to GATT in its handling of
"illicit commercial practices." The ECJ held that while it was established in cases such as InternationalFruit that GATT provisions were
not capable of conferring on Community citizens private rights, "nevertheless it cannot be inferred from thosejudgments that citizens may
not... rely on the provisions of GATT... [where such] provisions
form part of the rules in international law to which Article 2 (1) of that
regulation refers." 17 Clearly, then, the basis of the decision was not
the direct effect of GATT in Community law, but the ability to refer to
15 See Cases 21-24/72, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 1225-28, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 20-23
(1972).
16 Case 70/87, 1989 E.C.R. 1781, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 489 (1989).
17 Id. at 1830-31, [1991] C.M.L.R. at 524-25.
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GATT for interpretativepurposes to understand a piece of secondary legislation enacted under that treaty.
In Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council,' 8 a Japanese manufacturer
of typewriters and printers challenged a Community regulation that
imposed a twelve per cent antidumping duty on certain kinds of dotmatrix printers originating in Japan. Nakajima alleged that this
breached the Anti-Dumping Code of GATT. The preamble of the
challenged regulation stated that it was adopted in accordance with
international obligations, in particular those arising from the AntiDumping Code of GATT. The court noted that Nakajima was not relying on any notion of direct effect of GATT, but rather on its place in
the hierarchy of laws of the Community. As already stated, by virtue of
Article 228(7) of the EC Treaty, international treaties concluded by
the Community are superior to secondary Community legislation.' 9
Accordingly, the court accepted the argument that the challenged antidumping regulation, which had been enacted to implement the
Anti-Dumping Code of GATT, could be judged against the standard
of the GATT Code. In effect, the ECJ recognized the right of a private
party to invoke GATT incidentally to challenge the validity of secondary legislation which was designed to implement GATT provisions.
By 1994, on the eve of the creation of the WTO, however, the
court's position seemed to harden again when Germany tried to use
GATT to challenge the EC market in bananas, which restricts the volume of bananas from the "dollar zone. '20 In the Banana case, 21 the
ECJ rejected Germany's invocation of GATT, even though Germany
maintained that this was not a question of direct effect but rather of
the "hierarchy of laws" of the EC, in that secondary legislation could
be tested against the superior EC law of an international treaty-the
very argument the court accepted in Nakajima. There was, however, a
fundamental difference between the secondary legislation in Nakajima
and that in the Banana case. In Nakajima, the challenged secondary
legislation was tied to GATT-it had been enacted to implement
GATT provisions; in the Banana case, there was no such connection.
Germany sought direct, rather than an incidental, effect of GATT, a
18 Case 69/89, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2069.
19 See supra text accompanying note 8.
20 The restriction is an effort to help the Caribbean colonies of some Member
States, such as the United Kingdom and France, who cannot compete with the larger
growers of Central and South America.
21 Case 280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973,
affd, Case 466/93, Atlanta Fruchthandels-gesellschaft, 1995 ECJ Celex Lexis 3700

(Nov. 9, 1995).
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property that the ECJ has steadfastly maintained that GATT does not
possess. Accordingly, the court denied Germany's claim.
In conclusion, GATT, as an international treaty concluded by the
Community, is a part of Community law by virtue of Article 228(7) of
the EC Treaty. Its provisions, however, do not have direct effect in EC
law (the ruling in InternationalFruit). Private parties and Member
States may nonetheless invoke GATT incidentally to test the validity of
secondary legislation when that legislation refers to GATT provisions
(the ruling in Fediol) or has been expressly enacted to implement
GATT provisions (the ruling in Nakajima).
II.
A.

THE SITUATION AFTER T=E CREATION OF THE

WTO

Opinion 1/94: The Question of Competence to Conclude TRIPs

On April 6, 1994, one week before the signing of the WTO Agreements, the Commission, under Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty, asked
the ECJ the following question:
Does the European Community have the competence to conclude
all parts of the Agreement establishing the WTO concerning trade
in Services (GATS) and the trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods (TRIPs) on the
basis of the E.C. Treaty, more particularly on the basis of Article 113
E.C. alone or, in combination with Articles 100a E.C. and/or 235
22

E.C.?

The Commission advanced several arguments to sustain its position
that it had exclusive competence to conclude TRIPs.
1.

Express Powers

The Commission argued that the whole of the Agreement fell
within its express powers on the basis of the Common Commercial
Policy (CCP) of Article 113 of the EC Treaty. 23 The Commission argued that since the CCP encompasses all measures designed to influence the volume or structure of trade in goods and services and, since
the exercise or suppression of IPRs affects trade, the Community has
exclusive competence to conclude an international agreement on
IPRs. 24 As additional support, it pointed to several international treaties on IPRs that the Community had concluded. The court was not
convinced, however, and it concluded that with the exception of a
22 Article 228(6) Opinion, supra note 5, at 1-5283, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 213.
23 See id. at 1-5303-05, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 229-31.
24 See id. at 1-5313-16, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 239-42.
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narrow band of provisions, 25 the trade effects of IPRs were not suffi26
cient to bring them under the CCP of Article 113 of the EC Treaty.
2.

Implied Powers

As an alternative approach, the Commission argued that external
competence flowed from its implied powers. Linking EC Treaty Article 113 with Article 100a and/or Article 235, the Commission argued
that where Treaty provisions entrust to Community institutions the attainment of a specific objective and the participation of the Community is necessary to achieve that objective, the Community has implied
competence to act on the external plane, even where the competence
has not yet been exercised internally. 27 As support, the Commission
referred to the ERTA case, 28 in which the court held:
[E]ach time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, lays down common rules,
whatever form these may take, the member States no longer have
the right.., to contract obligations towards non-member States
affecting these rules ....
One cannot therefore, in implementing
the provisions of the Treaty, separate the category of measures in29
ternal to the Community from that of external relations.
In other words, external competence flows from internal competence,
and internal competence itself is demonstrated by the implementation of secondary legislation.
In its judgment, the court clarified its doctrine of implied powers.
Articles 100a and 235 of the EC Treaty do not create implicit exclusive
competence in the Community.3" The court also noted that when the
Community has included in its internal legislation provisions either
(a) relating to the treatment of nationals or nonmember countries or
(b) expressly conferring on its institutions powers to negotiate with
nonmember countries, its external competence is exclusive in areas
covered by those acts. 31 Where internal competence is unexploited
(i.e., where the Community has not yet legislated), the Community
25 See id. at 1-5404, [1995] 1 G.M.L.R. at 318 (dealing with release of counterfeit
goods into circulation).
26 See id. at 1-5404-09, [1995] 1 G.M.L.R. at 318-22.
27 See id. at 1-5318, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 243-44.
28 Case 22/70, Re European Road Transport Agreement, 1971 E.C.R. 263, [1971]
C.M.L.R. 335 (1971).
29 Id. at 274, [1971] C.M.L.R at 355.
30 See Article 228(6) Opinion, supra note 5, at 1-5409-19, [1995] 1 G.M.L.R. at
322-28.
31 See id. at 1-5410-16, [1995] [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 322-27.
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does not possess exclusive external competence.32 More specifically,
in the field of intellectual property and the TRIPs Agreement, the
court concluded that the Community and the Member States were
33
jointly competent to conclude the Agreement as a whole.
The court also raised the issue addressed in the ERTA case-that
when Community legislation would be affected if the Member States
participated in international agreements, the Community's external
competence becomes exclusive. However, it avoided dealing with it
head-on because, as it observed, little or no harmonization had been
34
accomplished by the Community in the specific fields of IPRs.
The court made no mention of the Community trademark which,
as an autonomous Community regime, creates independent Community intellectual property rights. The Community's competence in
this area cannot really be described as anything but exclusive, since its
competence in its own regime must be supreme. This competence
must, nevertheless, co-exist with equally full competences of the Member States in trademarks. Dr. Joseph Drexl has conveniently labeled
35
this competence "parallel."
B.

Limitations of the ECJ Reasoning in Opinion 1/94

The ECJ's conclusion on competence addressed the question of
conclusion and ratification of the TRIPs Agreement as a whole. Consequently, competence in this opinion is tied to the question of treaty
making power in international law. As already mentioned, the court
avoided addressing specifically the scope of competence in specific
fields of intellectual property within the internal regime of the Community. While the court did distinguish competence among different
parts of the WTO Agreement, it did not go so far as to make the question of competence provision-specific. But in explaining why the
Community did not have exclusive competence, it reviewed the nature of Community legislation in different fields of intellectual property. From that reasoning, conclusions may now be drawn that take
the question of competence outside the limited scope of the Opinion-that is, to conclude the TRIPs Agreement as a whole-and allow
us to apply it on the level of individual provisions.
It is submitted that, though Opinion 1/94 was not crafted to deal
with the scope of competence as linked to the question of direct effect, the court provided in its reasoning a better foundation to analyze
32
33
34
35

See
See
See
See

id. at 1-5411, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 322-23.
id. at 1-5419, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
id.
infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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the issue than its approach in Kziber, in which it skirted the issue of
competence.
C.

Competence Must Precede Direct Effect

36
In an illuminating article on the status of the TRIPs Agreement,
Dr. Drexl examines Opinion 1/94 and, using the court's reasoning as
a springboard, presents a spectrum of competence. In this scheme,
direct effect in Community law of individual provisions hinges on the
Community's external competence, which in turn depends on Community legislative activity in the various fields of intellectual property.
Drexl finds four degrees of Community external competence, depending on the degree of Community legislation: exclusive, parallel,
partial, and none.
Where there is complete internal harmonization, the Community
has "exclusive" external competence. Where there is no internal harmonization, the Community has no external competence.
"Partial" means that both the Community and the Member States
share competence. It denotes a field of intellectual property in which
the Community has begun to harmonize. The dividing lines within the
field between the Community's and Member States' competences are
determined by the nature of the Community's harmonizing legislation. "Hence, in this sector an identification of the nature of harmonizing Community legislation is required in order to define the
37
character of TRIPs obligations as Community or national law."
"Parallel" competence is full competence of both the Community
and the Member States. The Community's competence is exclusive;
the Member States' competence is full but not exclusive. This situation is created where the Community has introduced a full and independent regime of IPRs and left unharmonized the corresponding
IPRs of the Member States.
Clearly, then, an examination of the particular fields of IPRs is
needed to ascertain the degree of Community harmonization or legislation in that field and, from that, to determine the level of the Community's external competence in that field.
However, one thing is clear: the Community is moving slowly but
progressively toward exclusive competence in intellectual property as
it undertakes and completes harmonization in the various fields of

36 Josef Drexl, The TRIPs Agreement and the E.C.: What Comes Next AfterJoint CompeTO TRIPs-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 18 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,

tence, in FROM GATT

1996).
37 Id. at 36.
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intellectual property, and its external competence in intellectual
property rights will continue to expand. Drexl calls this the Principleof
dynamic competence; a provision which, for lack of Community competence, has no direct effect in Community law today, but may acquire
direct effect tomorrow with the Community's absorption, through
harmonization, of Member States' ever-shrinking competence. This
understanding is indispensable because Article 1 of the ratifying act,
Council Decision 94/8000,38 states that the WTO Agreements, including TRIPs, are approved "on behalf of the Community with regard to
thatportion of them which falls within the competence of the EuropeanCommunity. '' 39 This limited ratification of an agreement which, in its entirety,
is part of the Community legal order, becomes an organic mechanism
that grows with the spread of Community competence through
harmonization.
III.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF COMMUNITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAw

We must then undertake an overview of the current status of
Community legislation and harmonization in the broad areas of intellectual property rights. Drexl's characterization of the degrees of
Community competence-exclusive, partial, parallel, and none-will
be used.
A.

Exclusive

The Community has completely harmonized external border
controls and thus has exclusive competence in this area, as recognized
by the ECJ in Opinion 1/94.40
B. Parallel
In 1994, Directive 40/9441 launched the Community trademark,
obtainable by a single application and effective in all Member States.
In the Recitals of the directive, the Council recognizes that "the barrier of territoriality of the rights conferred on proprietors of trademarks by the laws of the Member States cannot be removed by
approximation of laws," and further that "national trademarks continue to be necessary for those undertakings which do not want pro38 1994 O.J. (L 336) 1.
39 Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
40 See Article 228(6) Opinion, supra note 5, at 1-5399-404, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at
314-18.

41 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1.

1999]

9

TRIPS AGREEMENT AND

DIRECT EFFECT

,,42 Thus, this
tection of their trademarks at Community level ....
regime operates alongside national regimes, not in place of themi.e., in it the Community possesses full competence parallel with that
of Member States.

C. Partial
As just noted, the Community has recognized that national trademarks continue to be necessary. This has not stopped it from endeavoring to harmonize national regimes; accordingly, some legislative
initiatives have been undertaken in this field. Council Directive 89/
10443 was passed to approximate aspects of trademark law which most
directly affect the functioning of the common market. It defined
trademark rights and limitations to those rights, as well as providing
common grounds for refusal of registration, invalidation, and exhaustion of rights. The Directive clearly stated, however, that it was not a
full-scale approximation of the trademark laws of the Member States
and that it did not "deprive the Member States of the right to continue to protect" various kinds of trademarks. 44 Accordingly, the ECJ,
in INT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH,45 declared that the Directive did not change the essential character of national trademark law. In view of these efforts, in Opinion 1/94 the
ECJ concluded that this field was partially harmonized.
In the field of copyright, Directive 93/8346 provided for the coordination of certain rules and rights applicable to satellite broadcasting. Directive 93/9847 harmonized the terms of copyright protection
and related rights. Directive 91/25048 made an effort to harmonize
the protection of computer programs. In that Directive, the Council
laid out its plan to remove existing differences from the laws of the
Member States insofar as they adversely and substantially affected the
functioning of the Common Market, while acknowledging that computer programs were to be protected by the copyright legislation and
jurisprudence of the Member States. In view of the incomplete nature
of the harmonization of the aforementioned Directives, the Community's competence in this field is only partial.
42

Id. at Recital 3.

43
44
45
46
47

1989 o.J. (L 40) 1.
Id at Recital 4.
Case 9/93, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994).
1993 O.J. (L 248) 15.
1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
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1991 o.J. (L 122) 42.
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None (So Far)

There has been no harmonization in the fields of industrial designs, undisclosed information, and internal enforcement.
Currently, patents are not harmonized. The 1973 Convention on
the Grant of European Patents4 9 did not create a Community patent;
it merely provided a method for simultaneously granting multiple national patents in order that separate national procedures would not be
necessary. The 1975 Community Patent Convention 50 did provide a
Community-wide patent, but it did not supersede national patents; it
merely provided that Community principles would guide the granting
of national patents henceforth. This Convention is not Community
law but an intergovernmental agreement among the Community's
States that leaves the national patent regimes untouched. Hence,
there remains an absence of Community competence in this field.
In the field of topographies of integrated circuits, there has been
a marked paucity of Community achievement. While Directive 87/
5451 proposed basic principles to be applied by all Member States in
the legal protection of circuit topographies, this did not amount to
harmonization.
Fitting these findings into our spectrum of competence, the following results emerge:
DEGREE OF COMMUNITY'S ExTERNAL COMPETENCE
DEGREE OF HARMONIZATION
OF LEGISLATION

FIELD OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OR ENFORCEMENT

EXCLUSIVE
PARALLEL

Complete harmonization

External border controls

Independent Community regimes

Trademarks

PARTIAL

Partialharmonization

(Community trademark)
Trademarks

NONE SO FAR

No harmonizationyet

Copyrights
Patents
Industrial designs

Internal enforcement

Topographies of integrated
circuits
Undisclosed information

49

1989 OJ. (L 401) 10.

50

Dec. 15, 1975, 15 I.L.M. 5 (signed, but not ratified).

No agreement was

reached at the Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference in July 1992.
51 1987 O.J. (L 24) 36.
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DIRECT EFFEcr AND TRIPs

Comparison of "Old" GATT and the WTO

One of the arguments that continues to be raised against the possibility of TRIPs provisions having direct effect is the ECJ ruling in
InternationalFruit5 2 that the old GATT provisions did not have direct
effect. As previously discussed, the ECJ came to this conclusion because of GATT's provisional character and consensual dispute settlement procedure.5 3 While all of GATT's problems have by no means
been completely ironed out, the main weaknesses of the old GATT,
which precluded direct effect, do not hamper the WTO's administration of the new GATT. To begin with, the former GATT, which was a
political understanding between states, is replaced by a new international organization-the WTO-which has legal personality.
The old GATT's greatest weakness was its dispute settlement procedure. Such was the consensual nature of that procedure that, for
instance, in the event of an alleged violation by a contracting party, a
'judgment" against that party had to be adopted by all membersincluding the infringing party! Under the new Understanding on
54
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
consensus is still an active principle-only now, consensus is required
to prevent a panel report from being adopted.
Even a cursory view of the judgment mechanism of the WTO
shows that the new GATT's approach has hardened into a more judicial, law-oriented approach. A panel whose independence has been
ensured5 5 assesses the facts of a case and determines if there has been
an infringement of TRIPs. 5 6 If an infringement is found, the report is

handed to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to be adopted within
sixty days after circulation of the report to WTO members. 5 7 Of particular note in this more judicial arrangement is the Standing Appellate Body. It consists of seven members who are appointed to fouryear terms. The Appellate Body's jurisdiction is limited to legal issues
52 Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit, 1972 E.C.RL 1219, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (1972).
53 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
54 Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 1 (1994),
33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
55 See id. art. '8.2.
56 Seeid art. 11.
57 See id. art. 16.4. This adoption process may be interrupted if a party to the
dispute notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal the report to the Standing Appellate
Body, or if the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.
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raised in the panel reports it receives; 58 nonetheless, by virtue of deciding questions of international law, it functions as an international
court. 59 On the whole, it is possible to agree with Joseph Drexl, when
he remarks, "[I] t is no longer commercial policy that controls international trade law, but international trade law will start to control com60
mercial policy."
The new law-oriented approach of the WTO is also displayed in
its enforcement measures, of which there are three kinds. The implementation of the recommendation of the DSB or Appellate Body is
the preferred approach, as this accords with the principle of subsidiarity.6 1 If the infringing member fails to implement the recommendations for adjusting its noncompliance with TRIPs provisions,
the Body can require the infringing member to compensate the aggrieved member. Finally, where no agreement can be reached on acceptable compensation, as a last resort, the aggrieved member may
62
request the DSB to suspend concessions under the law of the WTO.
Hence, the dispute settlement mechanism has some teeth because it
can dictate that violations of TRIPs ultimately may mean suspension of
TRIPs concessions, albeit that at least initially the suspension is re63
stricted to the same sector in which the violation occurred.
58 See id. art. 17.6.
59 See id.art. 17.14. The strength of the Standing Appellate Body's judgment is
weakened, however, by the provision that the DSB and the parties to the dispute must
adopt its judgment unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate
Body's report within thirty days after circulation of the report to the WTO members.

See id.
60 Drexl, supra note 36, at 53.
61 See DSU art. 22.
62 See id. art. 22.2.
63 See id art. 22.3. In the area of suspension of concessions, a weakness has
emerged in the context of the mixed agreement of the EC and its Member States with
their joint competences. In addition to the retaliatory measure of suspension of concessions outlined above, Article 22 provides that if the suspension of concessions

within the field of intellectual property when the infringement has occurred is not
effective to bring an end to the infringement, the Member may obtain authorization
to suspend concessions in other areas of trade. The peculiarities of the European
system ofjoint competences of the Community and Member States may make realiza-

tion of cross retaliation difficult in a mixed agreement like TRIPs. A Member State
that has won a panel judgment authorizing cross retaliation may find itself unable to
move-either within the context of TRIPs, because of the competence it shares with

Community, or in the broad area of trade in goods, as this area falls within the Community's exclusive competence. In effect, the "judgment" becomes worthless to the
Member State if it cannot enforce it. Drawing attention to this dilemma, the ECJ

stressed the need for cooperation between the Community and Member States. This
cooperation will need to be formalized by a Code of Conduct laying down procedures
for the conduct of the EC and its Member States within the framework of the WTO.
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B. Direct Effect of TRiPs on "Borrowed" Conventions
Several articles of TRIPs require its signatories to comply with
64
provisions of other international intellectual property conventions,
notably the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971),
and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. For those Member States that are already signatories of these
conventions, this presents no issue; they are already bound to comply.
But what of those nations that are not members of those conventions?
To what extent can measures "borrowed" from other conventions and
incorporated into TRIPs have direct effect in the national systems of
nations, members of which are "strangers" to the other intellectual
property conventions?
This much is clear: to the extent that the provisions of other intellectual property conventions are incorporated into TRIPs, its signatories are bound to respect those conventions. A violation of the
relevant provisions of another intellectual property convention incorporated into TRIPs is a violation of TRIPs. They are part of the TRIPs
regime because TRIPs has said that they are.
The question of their possible direct effect is easily answered by
reference to the reasoning set forth in this Note-direct effect is predicated upon competence. If the relevant TRIPs provision is within the
competence of the Community, it possesses the full potential of having direct effect. Given the understanding of dynamic competence
enunciated by Drexl, it seems certain that ultimately all facets of intellectual property will come under the exclusive competence of the
Community. Accordingly, it is possible to envision the case where all
the "borrowed" provisions could have direct effect, given compliance
with the objective criteria for direct effect.
C. Ratifying Acts and the Attempt to Exclude Direct Effect
Without a ruling from the ECJ, is it possible for direct effect to be
excluded? One possible source of authority for the exclusion of direct
effect may be found in the ratifying acts of the TRIPs Agreement. In
the Recitals of Council Decision 94/800,65 which implemented the
WTO Agreements, including TRIPs, the Council declared that TRIPs
provisions were not intended to be directly effective. This raises the
question of whether "opinions" expressed in a ratifying act are
binding.
64 See TRIPs Agreement arts. 1(3), 2(1), 3(1), 4, 9(1), 10, 14(3), 14(6), 16(2),
16(3), 22(2)(b), 35, 39(1), 62(3), 70(2).
65

1994 OJ. (L 336) 1.
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It appears that such opinions do not have binding legal force for
two reasons. First, it is an established principle in the Community that
recitals to a Community act are only aids to interpretation of individual provisions, not legal rules. They have no legal effect unless linked
to the interpretation of specific provisions of the act they accompany. 6 6 Here, there is no such link, as none of the provisions focus on
the issue of direct effect. Second, Community institutions are bound
by international agreements concluded by the Community.67 This implies that if an international agreement of the Community, by its nature and the wording of particular provisions, creates directly effective
provisions, Community institutions are bound by it and are unable,
through secondary legislation, to exclude direct effect.
It is arguable that the act that establishes the obligation should be
able to define the scope of the obligation. In most legal systems, the
scope of a law, be it national or international, is sought in the accompanying legislative notes which, though not binding, are regarded as
strongly persuasive because they are an expression of the intent of the
parties who entered into the agreement. In the Community, however,
if ratifying decisions were able to exclude direct effect, Community
institutions would be able to decide the direct effect of international
law within the Community. Indeed, the Council Decision implementing the TRIPs Agreement declared that, as a matter of international
law, the lack of direct effect was based on the very nature of the WTO.
What is a matter of international law, however, is a question for the
ECJ and not other institutions within the Community.
Divergent national attitudes toward direct effect of the TRIPs provisions, as stated in ratifying acts of TRIPs signatories, may explain the
Council's purported exclusion of direct effect. On the one hand,
some European countries, such as Germany, have declared in their
ratifying enactments that TRIPs will have direct effect. Others outside
the Community, such as the United States, have expressly denied such
effect. It may be that the Council declared that as a matter of international law no direct effect was possible because it feared that the enforcement of the rights under TRIPs would not be uniform. Drexl
explains the Council's approach as follows: "The Community's approach is guided by the fear that the U.S. would be able to maintain
political discretion in the design of its international commercial policy

66 See Case 215/88, Casa Fleischhandels-GmbH v. Bundesanstalt fur landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, 1989 E.C.R. 2789.
67

See EC TREATY art. 228(7).
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whereas the Community would be restricted in its actions by the inter68
ference of domestic courts including the ECJ."

What the Council seeks, in effect, is what Mengozzi has called
"negative equality of internal enforcement" 69 -a reciprocity among
the signatories of an international convention of the internal enforcement of the provisions of the agreement. According to the ECJ in the
Kupferberg case, though, this kind of reciprocity in internal enforcement is not affected by the fact that all of the parties to an agreement
do not give direct effect to its provisions. 70 Hence, whenever the
court decides the question of possible direct effect, it will not be
swayed by the lack of reciprocity in internal enforcement. In any case,
to exclude direct effect of these provisions as a matter of international
law is something only the ECJ can do.
D. A Sampling of TRIPs Provisions Which Might Have Direct Effect
Given our understanding that competence, as the condition precedent to direct effect, is a dynamic question, the issue of direct effect
cannot be addressed from a static vantage point. The question must
always be related to the current state of Community protection of
IPRs.
From the preceding chart7 ' we can compare the current status of
Community protection of IPRs with the relevant provisions of the
TRIPs Agreement:
DEGREE OF HARMONIZATION AND/OR COMPETENCE

Complete Harmnization-ExclusiveCompetence
Community trademark
External border controls
PartialHarmonization-PartialCompetence
Copyrights
Trademarks

TRIPs PROVISIONS

Articles 15-21
Articles 51-60
Articles 9-14
Articles 15-21

1. Copyright and Trademark
72
The provisions importing the Berne and Paris Conventions
might be capable of direct effect. Furthermore, several provisions
specifying terms of protection are likewise sufficiently clear and unam-

68 Drexl, supra note 36, at 39.
69

Mengozzi, Les droits des citoyens de l'Union europienne et l'applicabilite directe des

accords de Marrakech, 1994 REVUE DU MARCHE UNIQUE EUROPEEN 165, 169.
70 Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA. Kupferberg & Cie, 1982 E.C.R. 3641.
71 See supra Part Ill.
72 TRIPs Agreement art. 9 (copyright); id. arts. 16(2)-(3) (trademark).
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biguous. 73 There are provisions which are unique to both copyrights
and trademarks that may be included here. In copyrights, Article 11
(rentals) and Article 14(2) (reproduction of phonograms) enunciate
rights that Members are to provide in their regimes. In trademarks,
several provisions relating to the registration and maintenance of
trademarks appear to meet the requirements of direct effect,7 4 as do
portions of Article 21 relating to the licensing and assignment of
75
trademarks.
2.

Enforcement Provisions

In its Opinion 1/94, the ECJ rejected the argument that the enforcement provisions of Part III were part of a domain reservi of the
Member States and held that the Community could, through harmonization, acquire competence within this area.76 In general, though,
Part III's provisions on enforcement probably are not capable of having direct effect in Community law for several reasons. First, as things
now stand, the Community has not yet harmonized Member States'
enforcement regimes and, therefore, lacks competence in the area of
internal enforcement. Furthermore, TRIPs provides that Members
shall give effect to the provisions of TRIPs. 77 This places the responsibility upon each Member and implies that each Member has the authority commensurate with that responsibility. Finally, the wording of
the provisions of Part III generally requires Members to empower the
competent authorities to make various orders. This, of course, does
not give rise to an individual right as it leaves the empowered authority free not to make the desired order. In some cases, the wording
makes it clear that the enforcement measure is at the discretion of the
78
Member.
73 See id. arts. 12, 14(5) (copyright); id. art. 18 (trademarks).
74 See id. arts. 15(3)-(4), 19.
75 Namely, the prohibition against compulsory licensing of trademarks and the
right to assign a trademark "with or without the transfer of the business to which the
trade mark belongs." See id. art. 21.
76 See Article 228(6) Opinion, supra note 5, at 1-5419, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
77 See TRIPs Agreement art. 1(1).
78 There are some provisions, however, which seem to require provision of certain enforcement measures within Members' regimes without room for discretion.
See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement art. 41(1) (establishing a duty to ensure that enforcement
procedures are available in its law); id. art. 42 (granting the IPRs holder and defendant rights to civil administrative and judicial procedures); id. art. 50(4) (identifying
parties' right to notice and defendant's right of review, including right to be heard).
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Border Controls

Within Section 4 of TRIPs, Special Requirements Related to Border Measures, some provisions may have effect, including: Article
53(2), which provides for the right of an owner, importer, or consignee of goods to the release of impounded goods, and Article 55,
which sets a defined limit on the duration of suspension of the release
of impounded goods.
4.

Acquisition and Maintenance of IPRs

The right to review of final administrative decisions by a judicial
or quasi-judicial authority as enshrined in Article 62 (5) may be capable of direct effect, though in a recent United Kingdom High Court
decision, the court seemed to think that this article was in conflict
79
with Article 32, which, if true, would make direct effect impossible.
In addition, other general provisions might be capable of having
direct effect. It has been suggested, for example, that the nondiscrimination clauses of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in Articles 3 and 4 are sufficiently clear and unconditional to be
capable of having direct effect,80 though, it is submitted, this is not

true of Article 3(2).
E.

National Courts Answer the Question of the Direct Effect of TRIPs

TRIPs-related case law is still in its infancy, and, while there has
not yet been an ECJ case on the issue of the possible direct effect of
TRIPs, there have been a few cases in the national courts on this issue.
In Allen & Hanbuy's Ltd v. Controller of Patents, Designs, and Trademarks,8 ' a case of the Irish High Court, the court held that the provisions of TRIPs obliged the Controller to refuse a grant of license
pursuant to a domestic act. The court did not, however, base its judgment on the direct effect of TRIPs as a matter of Community law.
Rather, it recognized that the Irish legislature had already opened a
window for any treaty to supersede domestic law in a limited range of
patents (i.e., food and medicine). TRIPs would have direct effect because the domestic law said that it would, not because Community law
did. Hence, this case is not authority for the proposition that provisions of TRIPs might have direct effect in Community law.
79

See Lenzing AG's European Patent, [1997] R.P.C. & T.M. 245 (1996); see also

infra note 86 and accompanying text.
80 See Josef Drexl, Nach GATT und WIPO: Das TRTPs-Abkommen und seine
Anwendung in der Europaischen Gemeinschaf, 1994 GRUR INT. 777.

81

[1997] 1 N. Ir. 416 (H. Ct. 1996).
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82
In Azrak-Hamway International,
a United Kingdom Patent Office
preliminary hearing, the question of whether TRIPs was directly effective in United Kingdom law was addressed from the stance of competence as a condition precedent. First, the Examiner looked at the
field of intellectual property involved-here, it was industrial designs-and then asked whether in that field the Community had competence. When it found that it did not, it concluded that Articles 25
and 26 of TRIPs did not have direct effect as a matter of Community
law. The Examiner looked at the Recitals of the Council Decision for
guidance and noted that the Council had approved TRIPs on behalf
of the Community, only with regard to portions falling within the
competence of the Community. The Examiner's judgment became
severely flawed, however, when he reasoned that TRIPs provisions not
included within the competence of the Community were not part of
Community law. By virtue of Article 228(7) of the EC Treaty, though,
agreements concluded by the Community are binding upon the institutions of the Community and its Member States. Such agreements
are part of the legal order of the Community.8 3 What remains to be
seen is whether their provisions are in a form and of a nature to give
rise to individual rights.
Additionally, the argument was raised that the Member States
and the Community share an obligation to harmonize IPR protection
within the Community under TRIPs. It was argued that by signing the
TRIPs Agreement, the Member States had gone through the necessary
procedure and had, in effect, "voted" to provide the Community with
the necessary unanimity to enable it to use the Agreement as an indirect means of harmonization. The Examiner regarded this position as
untenable, however, and agreed with Azrak-Hamway International
that this argument had already been attempted by the Commission in
its submission to the ECJ in Opinion 1/94 and had been rejected by
84
the court.
In Lenzing AG's European Patent,the court held that TRIPs could
not have direct effect for several reasons: (1) the ECJ had already declared that the "old GATT" agreement could not have direct effect
and there was nothing in the "new GATT" which indicated that it was
intended to be otherwise; (2) any distinctions between the old and

82

Azrak-Hamway Int'l Inc.'s License of Rights Applic., [1997] R.P.C. & T.M. 134

(Ch. 1996).
83 See Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 449, [1975] 1
C.M.L.R. 515 (1974); see also The European Communities (Definition of Treaties)
(The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization) Order 1995, S.I. 1995,
No. 265 (stating that TRIPs Agreement is to be regarded as a Community treaty).
84 See Azrak-Hamway, [1997] R.P.C. & T.M. at 144.
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new GATTs were "inconsequential"; and (3) the WTO, and TRIPs in
particular, were merely agreements between nations.8 5 In any event,
the provision pleaded (Article 32) was considered not to be sufficiently clear and precise to have direct effect. It is submitted that the
court's judgment betrayed a cursory analysis of the issue before it and
was too dismissive of the differences between the "old" and "new"
86
GAT~s, which have already been reviewed in this Note.
From our examination of the aforementioned national cases, a
recurring practice emerges: national courts and tribunals use the Recitals of ratifying acts to understand the scope intended for Community legislation with which they are asked to deal. This is a perfectly
reasonable approach as long as it is applied correctly. National courts
and tribunals need to remember the position the ECJ has taken on
Recitals-that they are not binding legal rules unless they are linked
to specific provisions of the legislation they preface. Courts need to
be less mechanical in their consideration of the possible direct effect
of TRIPs provisions, as it would be cumbersome to refer to the ECJ in
every case in which a provision of TRIPs is at issue. In any case, the
courts have displayed a reluctance to do so.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note has endeavored to show how direct effect of TRIPs is
not only desirable but also possible. It is desirable on both the individual and collective level. Some Member States have a dualist approach to international law, requiring that treaties concluded by their
governments be formally enacted by their legislatures. Finding direct
effect of TRIPs provisions within Community law, which is supreme
within national legal systems, allows individuals to benefit immediately
from these rights on a Community-wide basis, as well as nationally,
and not have to wait for years before their national legislature "gets
around" to implementing the provisions of the agreement in national
legislation.
On a collective level, it seems obvious that allowing TRIPs provisions to have direct effect as a matter of Community law promotes the
realization of the Common Market-an ideal that has eluded the
Community in the field of intellectual property.
It is further submitted that, due to the changes in the institutional structure of GATT which took place with the creation of the
WTO and its dispute resolution mechanism, it is possible to give direct
effect to its provisions. GATT is no longer merely a political, intergov85 Lenzing AG's European Patent, [1997] R.P.C. & T.M. 245, 246-47 (1996)
86

See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
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ernmental understanding, but rather an identifiable international
legal personality with a judicial dispute resolution mechanism. It is
particularly the strengthening of its dispute resolution mechanism
which may make it possible to hold that "rights" have been created. If
this analysis proves to be accurate, then the only question left for a
provision is whether it meets the objective criteria established by the
ECJ for direct effect; it is submitted that some provisions, especially
those embedded in particular fields of intellectual property, do meet
those tests. If such is the case, we may conclude that in shopping for
an effective protection of her IPRs, the innovator need no longer be
faced with the rule of the old GATT provisions-"Look but don't
touch!"-but may now appropriate for herself rights from the most
comprehensive system of IPRs the community of nations has yet
produced.
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